# EXHIBIT 10

# MAO DECLARATION ISO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION

# Google

# **GEO Privacy Champion**


**Key Privacy Concepts** 

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
#### Agenda

- Data Classification
- Transparency & Control principles
- Data Protection
- Wipeout
- Logging


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Data Classification Guidelines: go/dcg

2 slide

#### PII - Personally Identifiable Information

PII: Information that personally identifies an individual and any other data which can be reasonably linked to such information by Google. Examples:

- An individual's name, email address, mailing address, or telephone number, either alone or in combination, are considered PII.
- PII includes any information that is combined with PII or can be linked to PII with a reasonable level of confidence based on information available to Google.
- Solely for the purposes of classifying data internally at Google, the following types of data are classified as PII by default
  until reclassified: IP addresses, and unique account identifiers (such as account or customer ID, GAIA ID, or screen
  name).

Data categorized as PII under these Guidelines may differ from data defined as "personal information," "personal data," or "personally identifiable information" in Google's external statements or applicable laws.

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#### SPII - Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information

SPI...



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#### SPII - Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information

SPII: Data that presents a significant risk of harm to an individual if it is compromised or misused. Examples:

- · Account Credentials: non-public information used to log in, authenticate or authorize activity as a particular individual
- Government Identification Numbers: any state or national identification number, including Social Security Number (SSN), passport number, or driver's license number
- Cardholder Data (CHD): Information associated with a specific payment card account (including credit cards, debit cards, or any other payment card)
- Financial Account Data: Information about a specific financial transaction (financial account numbers, amount of the transaction, what was purchased, the identity of the merchant, and the date of the transaction)
- . Healthcare Information: details about an individual's past, present or future physical or mental health or condition.
- Sensitive Background Information: any information relating to an identifiable individual's ethnicity, political affiliation, sexual orientation, or religious affiliation.

Data categorized as SPII may differ from data defined as "sensitive personal data" in Google's external statements or applicable

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#### SPII - Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information

SPII: Data that presents a significant risk of harm to an individual if it is compromised or misused. Examples:


- · Account Credentials: non-public information used to log in, authenticate or authorize activity as a particular individual
- Government identification Numbers: any state or national identification number, including Social Security Number (SSN), passpo

#### Cardholder Data (CHD), Information Sensitive and Personally Identifiable Count (including credit cards, debit cards.)

- or any other payment card)
- Financial Account Data: Information about a specific financial transaction (financial account numbers, amount of the
- Healthcare Information: details about an individual's past present or future physical or mental health or condition
- Sensitive Background Information Sensitive but not necessarily Personally Identifiable micity, political affiliation, sexual


As anticipated, let's refer to both these classes as SPII

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
#### Data Classification Guidelines: go/dcg

Google's corporate services are intended for use with Google's data, and all data transmitted or stored using corporate services will be treated as the property of Google, even if the data turns out to be for personal rather than work-related purposes .... Googlers may use corporate services for personal purposes within reason, but any expectations of privacy when doing so are diminished ...




Data Classification Guidelines: go/dcg

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#### Introduction to Transparency & Control

All products that opt-in users into data collection, should provide users with:

- Transparency: ability to see / manage the collected data
- Control: ability to opt-out of data collection

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#### **User Data Transparency and Control**

**Transparency** involves clear, comprehensive communication from Google to the user. It means **users are never surprised** by the collection, use or retention of their data.

- What: A clear explanation of any consequential change to the availability or presentation of user data.
  - o e.g. privacy-related user setting or sharing actions.
- Where the user expects it. Obvious, non-intrusive.
  - o e.g. in-flow on a dialog or settings page.
- When the user needs it and can use it.
  - o **Before** the any action is taken, even if reversible.
- . How the user can best understand it.
  - Friendly, understandable language. Links to more detailed information.

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Googlers aren't typical users. It's kind of a cliche, but it's even more relevant to T&C than it is to dogfood feedback. We can't practically aim for "no single user will ever be surprised", but this absolutely needs to be true at the high end of the distribution.

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Example of a "When" transparency problem (courtesy of Bryan Horling in a comment thread on Geo Footprints, Technical Options)

We push for real-time wherever possible because 1) people are more aware of an event right after they do it and 2) we never want to make it look like we don't have data that we have.

When data arrives late, then users can look for that activity, and incorrectly conclude that the data was not recorded, only to be surprised by it at some later date.

This undermines our broader story on transparency and control. To put this in a different perspective, there are also European DPAs who are actively testing our products and requesting written explanations of their findings, to see what data shows up when and how deletion requests affect what we store. They influence policy, regulation and litigation, so it's good to have a tight, coherent story.

### User Data Transparency and Control

Control is about finding a balance between...



... and ...

#### A Cockpit

- Too many switches
- · Complex, hard to understand
- Less likely to be used

#### An Ultimatum

- Not enough choice
- Confusing and frustrating
- Potential user abandonment

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So implementing proper T&C sound kind of tricky, no? Fortunately, we have a framework to help with most of it. .... Footprints (next slide)

#### Setting the expectations

We're not expecting each new piece of data we collect to have its dedicated switches, knobs and transparency UI - most of the times it falls within the boundaries of one of the existing UDC (User Data Controls) settings, and we can leverage existing tools:

- Web & App Activity (WAA)
- Supplemental Web & App Activity (sWAA)
- Voice & Audio Activity (VAA)
- Device Information (DI)
- Location History (LH)
- YouTube Search/Watch History (YTS/YTW)


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
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Understanding these principles helps us understand WHY some ideas are bad, because **acting on intuition is not always best**. What are the principles being applied by the Geo Privacy Champion below?



Let's log phone unlock events along with location data... and then we provide transparency through Web & App Activity

Not so fast! The user would get insufficient value out of "Unlocked your phone at \$place" events. And even though unlocking is an "explicit action" it is also unavoidable. Further, this data is no better than collecting location data periodically, and we already have Location History for that.



Use information to provide our users with valuable products and services.

FAIL! Dozens of events like "You unlocked your phone near 4th and main" are of dubious value in isolation, and offers no additional value beyond location history which we already have.

Give users meaningful choices to protect their privacy.

FAIL! Allowing the user to "choose" not to use the product is not a meaningful choice. Asserting otherwise risks being made into the subject of your very own meme template!

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Try to make somebody given an answer to "which principles are being applied here?".

Post-transition:

Can anyone guess the target of that link? It's Vic Gundotra.

Who's he?

Former SVP of social.

#### Why's he relevant?

During the real names privacy hoopla, he publicly proposed giving users the "choice" not to use the product if they don't find it's privacy controls sufficient. Guess where he is now? He resigned. (do provide the context: that fact isn't necessarily directly related to the meme content, but it's still relevant as it shows that even high-level pressure against these principles can be successfully opposed.)

#### A word on T&C for "Share" action (go/core-sharing-tenets)

- 1. Users have to know what identity is sharing. (Who am I?)
- 2. Users have to know what content they are sharing. (What am I doing?)
- 3. Users have to know what audience they are sharing to. (Who can see?)
- 4. Users must have access to a "make it stop" button. (How can I stop this?)


Why? Because this is the subject matter of our consent decree, it's one of the most sensitive things which it's possible to do at Google.


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# Coffee Break (see you in 10 min)

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## Auditing

Authentication and Authorization are at the core of the data protection stack, however ignoring what happens after the authentication would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the entire stack, exposing data to abuse or misuse.

At high level, User Data can be accessed in two ways:


- Directly, through
- Indirectly, through

Both of them need auditing, though with different tools and methods



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
go/bcid bcid/

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
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Think about , which only offers SELECT and MATERIALIZE primitives.

### Wipeout

The goal of **Wipeout** is to provide transparency around user data deletion: it is the verification mechanism that ensures we honor service removal and account closure requests from users within a reasonable timeframe.

In this context a "reasonable" amount of time is 63 days\* from the time of the user request action for live systems and 180 days from the time of the request for offline/backup systems. Unless an alternative retention plan has been defined and approved.

#### Wipeout Events

- service removal a service is disassociated with an account (e.g., removing Google+), but the account still exists.
- account closure an account, and all its associated data, is terminated by user request.
- item deletion\*\* a single item (e.g.: a photo or a day of Location History) is explicitly deleted by the user.

(\*) intended as the request-to-physical deletion time (depends on storage) (\*\*) item deletions are not monitored by the Wipeout dashboard.



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To be Wipeout compliant, products must:
Delete live user data within 63 days of a deletion request.
Delete all user data within 180 days of a deletion request.
Integrate with the Wipeout Dashboard.
Maintain an updated Privacy Design Document.
Designate an owner to respond promptly to Wipeout dashboard alerts.

Pubsub - no cleanup

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#### We have to delete a lot of data.

- Any data collected or processed from (or about) users.
  - o Any data which is keyed to a particular user identity;
  - o Data derived from identity-keyed data;
  - o Per-user aggregates and pseudonymous data;
  - Some metadata
- But we sometimes can (or have to) keep:
  - o Genuinely anonymous or aggregated data;
  - o Billing or payment data;
  - o Data which is requested as part of some ongoing legal investigation;

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(Backup copies of data which we have in another form. (?)

## It isn't always obvious where the data lives.


- Data which is keyed to a non-GAIA identifier:
  - Zwieback
  - o MAC Address, Android ID, Apple ID
  - o Email address, Phone Number
- Data stored in someone else's row:
  - o ACLs pointing at someone else's data;
  - Recommendation data;
- Data which contains an implicit identifier or is traceable to a user identifier:
  - o Obfuscated GAIA
  - o Anything with enough persistent bits to create an implicit identifier

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## Even when we know where it is, it's still hard.

- · Distributed architecture:
  - o Within a single datastore, data may have multiple replicas;
  - o Eventual consistency makes deletion timing difficult;
- Massive Scale, Zero-Tolerance Guarantees:
  - o Deletions must either commit or noisily fail.
  - o An issue affecting 1 in 1,000,000 users per year affects 2,000 users.
- Deep tech stack:
  - o Data is constantly in transit.
  - o Deleting in one datastore does not necessarily get rid of particular data.

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## But things still fail.


- People think their storage handles it automatically... and it doesn't.
- People think the data in their system is fresh... and it isn't.
- People think their online deletion path is reliable... and it's only mostly reliable.
- People think that deletion is globally instantaneous... and the speed of light is finite.
- · People try to anonymize... and fail.

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Sometimes 'fresh' is actually from a different origin datastore



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go/ (\*) users need to have transparency about the presence of precise location data attached to events (\*\*) aliases and corresponding addresses must not appear together in the "query" field

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# **Datapol Annotations**

The Google Data Policy (DataPol) protocol buffer annotations provide a systematic way of specifying the intended semantics of user data. This allows Google to identify and control this data and to help applications handle a user's data in ways that comply with Google's privacy policies. These annotations are used in a wide range of privacy tools and processes, such as policy checking, privacy analysis, access control, and privacy documentation.


#### What needs to be annotated

- SPII
- PII
- Pseudonymous IDs, session IDs or timestamps that can be used to join records from multiple sources.
- Cookies, document IDs, user agents, URLs, HTTP headers, and requests.
- IP addresses, and device IDs.
- Location of the user or a device.
- Demographic information such as birth date, age, or gender.

... and this is how do they look like...

optional string business\_address = 800 {
 (datapol.semantic\_type) = ST\_LOCATION,
 (datapol.location\_qualifier) = {
 precise\_location: true
 non\_user\_location: true }};

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


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